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The trade/labor linkage has a long history.' It has become
one of the most contentious contemporary issues in trade and
labor policy circles and debates.2 The idea of using international
labor standards to protect workers from economic exploitation
was first promoted by individual social reformers in Europe in
the first half of the 19th century at the early stages of the In-
dustrial Revolution. The work of these reformers was later
taken over by various nongovernmental organizations. Calls for
international labor legislation increased dramatically during the
second half of the 19th century and found expression in various
international organizations that were formed (often interna-
tional associations of trade unions).
Intergovernmental action for international labor legislation
began to be reflected in international conferences beginning in
1890. Many of these early efforts were motivated by the concern
that in the absence of international labor standards, interna-
tional competition in an environment of increasingly freer trade
would precipitate a race to the bottom. The Treaty of Versailles
* University of Toronto Law School.
University of Michigan Law School.
1. See Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on
the World Trading System: An Historical Overview, 126 INT'L LAB. REV. 565, 565
(1987); Virginia Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause
(GATT, ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2 FAiR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 177, 182-
83 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Baatlhodi Molatlhegi, Trade
and Labour Interface in the Context of Economic Integration: The Case of the
Southern African Development Community (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Toronto Faculty of Law) (on file with author).
2. See generally Brian Langille, Eight Ways to Think About International La-
bour Standards, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 27, 27-53 (1997). Langille discusses the argu-
ments and motives of eight major debates regarding international labor. Id. at 33.
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in 1919 established the International Labour Organization
(ILO).3 The preamble of the ILO Constitution notes that "the
failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is an
obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the
conditions in their own countries."4 Under Article 33 of the ILO
Constitution, the governing body may recommend that the Con-
ference take "such action as it may deem wise and expedient to
secure compliance" with recommendations of commissions of in-
quiry or where the matter has been referred to the International
Court of Justice with the recommendation of the Court.5 Some
commentators have suggested that this does not completely rule
out the question of trade sanctions, as is contemplated as a pos-
sibility in the case of recent adverse ILO determinations against
Myanmar (Burma) with respect to forced labor.6 The ILO, a tri-
partite organization of government, employers and worker rep-
resentatives, however, has mostly pursued its mandate by set-
ting minimum international labor standards through
Conventions and Recommendations, subject in the former case
to ratification by member states and promoted by investigation,
public reporting and technical assistance, but not formal sanc-
tions.
The ILO formally entered the trade/labor interface debate
in 1994 at the time of discussion of a possible inclusion of a so-
cial clause in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT), the establishment of a link between trade and labor in
differing forms within the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU), and the condi-
tioning of trade preferences and concessions by some developed
countries on respect for labor standards. The ILO set up a
Working Party on the social dimensions of the liberalization of
international trade, but in 1995, the ILO's governing body con-
cluded that the Working Party would not pursue the question of
trade sanctions and that further discussion of a link between in-
ternational trade and social standards or a sanction-based social
clause mechanism would be suspended. 7 In 1998, however, the
3. See http://www.ilo.rulabout/ilo/htm for information on the origins of the
ILO.
4. ILO CONST. preamble, available at www.ilo.org/public/english/about/ilo
const.htm#alp2 (last modified May 2, 2001).
5. Id. at art. 3.
6. See Press Release, ILO, Forced Labour Persists in Myanmar: ILO Applies
Extraordinary Constitutional Procedures (Mar. 29, 2000), available at www.ilo.org/
public/english/bureau/inflpr/2000/9.htm (last modified Mar. 29, 2000).
7. See Bill Brett, Editorial, Social Linkage Remains on the ILO Agenda, FIN.
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ILO adopted a Declaration of Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work (Declaration) providing that all members have
an obligation to respect and promote certain core labor stan-
dards (CLS): 1) freedom of association and the right to engage in
collective bargaining, 2) the elimination of forced labor, 3) the
elimination of child labor, and 4) the elimination of discrimina-
tion in employment.8 This Declaration parallels in many re-
spects references to core international labor standards in the
United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948), the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that
came into force in 1976.9 The ILO membership, however, re-
jected a proposal by its Director-General in 1997 that the ILO
promote and administer a country-based certification and label-
ing program for products from countries complying with core la-
bor standards.' 0
The 1948 Havana Charter that was intended to embody the
framework for a new world trading system declared that 'Mem-
bers recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in pro-
duction for export, create difficulties in international trade and
accordingly each member shall take whatever action may be ap-
propriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its
territory."" The Havana Charter, however, was never adopted
because of opposition in the U.S. Congress, 12 and the GATT in
Article XX refers only to measures relating to products of prison
TIMES UK, May 10, 1995, at 18.
8. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, art.
2, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237 (1998).
9. See Molatlhegi, supra note 1, at ch. 2; Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade
Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for
Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 16-17
(1996) (noting the various provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
10. See Christopher McCrudden and Anne Davies, A Perspective on Trade and
Labour Rights, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 43, 47 (2000) (noting that the attempt to link cer-
tain labor issues to a labeling scheme was not accepted by the main decision-making
body of the ILO); see also Holly Cullen, The Limits of International Trade Mecha-
nisms in Enforcing Human Rights: The Case of Child Labour, 7 INT'L. J. CHILD. RTS.
1, 15 (1999) (noting that developing countries protested "any linkage of trade and
core labour standards" that "disguised protectionism" even if the system was volun-
tary).
11. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948,
1948 Can. T.S. No. 32, at art. 7(1), available at http:// www.wto.org/englishldocse/
legal e/prewto -legal-e.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
12. See John Evans, The Trade Union View on International Labour Stan-
dards, Background Note for ITGLWF Conference on International Trade (Oct. 5,
1995), available at www.tuac.org/statement/communiq/itglwl.htm.
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labor (Article XX(e)), measures necessary to protect public mor-
als (Article XX(a)), and measures relating to human life or
health (Article XX(b)). 13 The Ministerial Declaration following
the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 ap-
pears to have removed labor issues from the WTO agenda and
remitted them to the ILO. The 2001 Doha Ministerial Declara-
tion re-affirms this position. 14
A number of international commodity agreements, starting
with the International Tin Agreement of 1954, contain labor
standards provisions, but no dispute settlement or enforcement
mechanisms. 15 According to critics, the inclusion of such clauses
was intended to protect industries in developed countries from
competition from developing countries. 16
Under 1984 U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
legislation, the U.S. President, in determining eligibility for
GSP status, must take into account, amongst other things,
whether the concerned country is taking steps to ensure inter-
nationally recognized workers' rights.' 7 The Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act of 1983 was the first U.S. legislation in
recent history to condition trade on foreign labor standards.18
The U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ex-
panded the provisions of the 1974 Trade Act to cover cases in-
volving alleged violations of internationally recognized labor
rights: if investigations by the U.S. Trade Representative show
that U.S. trade rights have been violated, his or her office may
authorize retaliatory measures, including imposition of restric-
tions on imports from the concerned country.' 9
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], art. XX(a), XX(b), XX(e).
14. Doha Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, 41 I.L.M.
746, 747 (2002) (noting that out of fifty-two declarations only one dealt with labor
issues). 'We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference
regarding internationally recognized core labor standards. We take note of work
under way in the International Labor Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of
globalization." Id. at 747.
15. See Joan M. Smith, North American Free Trade and the Exploitation of
Working Children, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 57, 89-90 (1994).
16. Molatlhegi, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
17. 19 U.S.C.A. §2462 (b)(2)(G) (West 1999).
18. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706, 16 U.S.C. § 7652 (Supp. 1983)).
19. See generally Drusilla K. Brown et al., International Labor Standards and
Trade: A Theoretical Analysis, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:
PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE 234-36 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds.,
1996) (providing a useful review of the evolution of labor standards in U.S. trade pol-
icy legislation).
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The EU first mooted the possibility of linking labor stan-
dards to trade preferences by proposing the introduction of labor
standards into the Lom6 Convention in 1978 to ensure that de-
veloping countries with labor conditions which met the require-
ments of international labor conventions should not be penal-
ized in their trade with the EEC by being out-competed by
countries that do not comply with such conventions. 20 This pro-
posal was not implemented in the face of intense opposition
from developing countries. 21 In 1994, the EU finally established
a link between trade and labor standards in the context of its re-
lationship with developing countries through its GSP system, in
which additional GSP preferences were offered to countries
committing themselves to respect international labor stan-
dards.22
With respect to trade and labor standards linkages in re-
gional trading arrangements, within the European Union, the
social dimension of European integration took concrete form in
1991 when eleven of the twelve member states (excluding the
United Kingdom) signed the community's Charter of Funda-
mental Social Rights.23 Another important step in the develop-
ment of EU social policy was the adoption by the eleven mem-
bers (excluding the UK) of the Protocol on Social Policy at
Maastricht in 1991.24 The content of the Social Chapter is fun-
damentally the same as that of the Charter and contains a
number of guarantees of basic labor rights. Under NAFTA, the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) re-
quires the NAFTA parties to effectively enforce their own labor
laws, and they are subject to specialized dispute settlement
processes and ultimately fines enforceable through trade sanc-
tions in the event of findings of non-enforcement. 25
20. See Memorandum on the Linking of Economic Aid and Human Rights,
COM(78)47 final, at 9-10 (1978).
21. Id.; Demetrios James Marantis, Human Rights, Democracy, and Develop-
ment: The European Community Model, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 6 (1994).
22. See Cullen, supra note 4, at 12; Molatlhegi, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
23. See Standing Committee of the Hospitals of the European Union, available
at http://www.hope.be/07publileaflet/socdial/eucomp.htm.
24. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 247, 357-58; see also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Re-
lations Theory: An Anlysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, n.
393 (1995) (citing John T. Addison & W. Stanley Siebert, Recent Developments in
Social Policy in the New European Union, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5, 5-6
(1994)).
25. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1499.
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As noted above, the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration
launching a new multilateral Round, confirms the 1996 Singa-
pore Ministerial Decision to remit all international labor stan-
dards issues to the ILO. The issue of a trade/labor linkage, how-
ever, seems unlikely to go away. Regionally, the potential
expansion of NAFTA into a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) will raise the scope and status of the NAFTA Labor Side
Accord in this broader context. Furthermore, unilateral trade
actions by states on account of labor practices prevailing in
other states may well provoke trade disputes that will require
adjudication by international trade dispute settlement bodies.
I. THE CHOICE OF POLICY OBJECTIVE
Reviewing both contemporary and historical debates about
the case for a trade policy-labor standards linkage, several nor-
mative rationales for a trade policy-labor standards linkage
emerge and are often largely elided in debates, which then
greatly complicates the task of evaluating the appropriate choice
of instrument and choice of institutional arrangement for vindi-
cating the chosen policy objectives.
A. UNFAIR COMPETITION
It is often argued that countries that sell goods into export
markets that are produced by processes that fail to respect or
comply with internationally recognized labor standards are en-
gaging in an unfair form of competition that deprives domestic
producers in export markets and producers and exporters in
third country markets who comply with these standards of le-
gitimate market share. Countries in which internationally rec-
ognized labor standards are not complied with are often accused
of "social dumping," or indirect or implicit and illicit subsidiza-
tion. These economic activities, entailing either lax labor laws
or ineffective enforcement of nominally compliant laws (or both),
are analogized to economic dumping and direct subsidization
that may attract anti-dumping duties or countervailing duties
under Article VI of the GATT and current WTO Agreements on
anti-dumping and subsidization and countervailing duties.26
For the text of NAAL'C, see http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml.
26. See generally Dani Rodrik, Labor Standards in International Trade: Do
They Matter and What Do We Do About Them, in EMERGING AGENDA FOR GLOBAL
TRADE: HIGH STAKES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 35-79 (1996); Adelle Blackett,
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Without further and careful specification, this rationale for
linking international trade policy and/or sanctions with labor
standards is largely incoherent. From the perspective of import-
ing countries, generically lower labor costs in exporting coun-
tries enhance consumer welfare in importing countries, and by
more than reductions in producer welfare in the latter. From
the perspective of exporting countries, particularly developing
countries, the latter rightly argue that in the early stages of in-
dustrialization, entailing mass production of low technology
products (e.g., textiles, clothing, footwear, processed agricultural
products), low-cost and low-skilled labor is one of the principal
sources of their competitive advantage. To deny them the abil-
ity to exploit this advantage is to consign them forever to low
value-added commodity production for developed country mar-
kets ("hewers of wood and drawers of water").
However, it is crucial not to overstate the significance of
this source of comparative advantage. While it is true that the
earnings of low-skilled workers relative to high-skilled workers
in the United States and other developed countries have de-
clined in recent years (or unemployment levels increased), most
empirical studies show that increased trade with low-wage de-
veloping countries may account for at most twenty per cent of
this reduction, and most of the increase in the wage gap be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers is attributable to techno-
logical change and, in the case of the United States, also to rap-
idly declining rates of unionization.27 More importantly, there is
almost no evidence that the reduction in relative earnings of un-
skilled workers in developed countries that is reasonably attrib-
utable to increased trade with developing countries relates to
noncompliance with core labor standards rather than simply
lower wages. Even in this latter respect, as Paul Krugman and
many other economists have pointed out, the growth rate of liv-
ing standards essentially equals the growth rate of domestic
Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation, 31
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 1-80 (1999).
27. For extensive reviews of the empirical literature, see generally Drusilla K
Brown, International Trade and Core Labour Standards: A Survey of the Recent Lit-
erature, (OECD Occasional Papers No. 43), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/OLI
S/2000DOC.NSF/4f7adc214b91a685c12569fa005d0ee7/c125692700623b74c125696e0
056ca76/$FILE/00083851.PDF (Oct. 4, 2000); Keith E. Maskus, Should Core Labor
Standards Be Imposed Through International Trade Policy?, (World Bank, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 1817) available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/
PublicationslWorkpapers/WPS1800series/wpsl817/wpsl8l7.pdf (Aug. 1997).
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productivity. 28 In the case of the United States, exports are only
ten percent of the GNP, which means the United States is still
almost 90 percent an economy that produces goods and services
for its own use. Data show almost a one-to-one relationship be-
tween labor productivity and labor costs in manufacturing in a
wide range of developed and developing countries. 29 Labor pro-
ductivity, or total factor productivity, is a function of many fac-
tors, including public investments in education and training,
health care, infrastructure, and law and order. Thus, it is a fal-
lacy to assume that low wages are the principal driving force
behind today's global trade or foreign direct investment flows.
This relationship between labor productivity and labor costs ex-
plains why internationally most firms are not seeking to relo-
cate to e.g. Bangladesh despite its low wages, and why most in-
ternational trade and foreign direct investment flows are still
dominated by developed countries as countries of origin and
countries of destination.
Economic theory strongly suggests that the immediate im-
position of common international labor standards across-the-
board, based on developed country standards, would substan-
tially reduce total economic welfare as conventionally measured
in importing countries, exporting countries, and globally. 30 This
theory is of course a mischaracterization of what those who fa-
vor linkage are "demanding," which is at most a gradual pro-
gressive movement towards higher standards as appropriately
contextualized to the situation of individual developing coun-
tries. Besides, at least with respect to CLS, the welfare effects
of compliance are likely to be positive in developing countries
themselves. Price effects in importing countries are likely to be
minor. An important study by the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (OECD), published in 1996, con-
cluded that compliance with CLS is likely to have no negative
28. See PAUL KRUGMAN, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, in POP
INTERNATIONALISM 3, 9 (1997).
29. DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 76 (1997) (noting that
"wages in a poor exporting country that are one-tenth the U.S. level do not disad-
vantage workers in the United States when labor productivity in that country is also
lower by a factor of 10")
30. See Brown, Deardorff & Stern, supra note 19, at 240 (noting that a common
standard set by all countries would lead to a rise in world price). "If the standard is
imposed in the labor-intensive sector, then workers in all sectors of the economy are
made worse off." Id. at 255; Brown, supra note 27, at 41 237 and at 42 242; Mas-
kus, supra note 27, at 14 ("The imposition of CLS may or may not improve welfare
and may not be the first-best approach .... Political imperfections strongly raise the
likelihood that CLS will not be adequately provide in distorted economies.")
[Vo1.14:2
TRADE POLICY & LABOR STANDARDS
implications for exporting countries in terms of export and
growth performance. 31 There remain some skeptics about the
welfare implications of particular CLS.32 A recent ILO study,
however, using state of the art techniques of economic modeling,
predicts that substantial welfare gains from the elimination of
child labor over a two decade period will net the required in-
vestment in education and related programs.3 3 Another study,
by Morici and Schultz, echoes the OECD 1996 conclusions, find-
ing a significant positive correlation between improvements in
respect to CLS and economic growth and development in South-
ern countries. 34
Even stated in fairness rather than welfare terms, if it is
unfair for firms and workers in developed countries to have to
compete with firms and workers in developing countries with
access to low-paid, low-skilled labor, by the same token, it is
equally unfair for developing countries to have to compete with
firms and workers in developed countries that depend on highly-
skilled labor forces, highly-developed infrastructure, large pub-
lic investments in education and research and development, ex-
tensive health care systems, effective law and order, and supe-
rior institutions, in most cases reflecting collective or public
investments on a scale that far exceeds the capacity of most de-
veloping countries. Thus, this unfair competition argument, in
and of itself, is totally indeterminate and carries high risks of
the trade policy-labor standards linkage being exploited for pro-
tectionist ends. In this respect, it is important to emphasize
that the unfair competition argument focuses principally on the
welfare implications of non-compliance with international labor
standards for citizens or interests in importing countries.
31. See OECD, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF
CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 98 (1996); see generally Rodrik,
supra note 26, at 52-59 (noting that although labor costs tend to increase as stan-
dards become more stringent, low labor standard do not necessarily create compara-
tive advantages nor do they encourage foreign direct investment).
32. For example, the scope of the collective bargaining entitlement, or the per-
emptory termination of child labour without pre-empting inferior substitution effects
through rendering basic education more accessible. See generally Brown, supra note
27, at 28 145 (noting that there is evidence that employment of older children can
be productive and humanely combined with schooling); Maskus, supra note 27.
33. International Labour Office, International Programme on the Elimination
of Child Labour, Investing in Every Child: An Economic Study of the Costs and Bene-
fits of Eliminating Child Labour, at 4, available at http://www.ilo.orgtpublic/english/
standards/ipec/publIdownload2003-12 investingchild.pdf (Dec. 2003).
34. See PETER MORICI & EVAN SCHULTZ, LABOR STANDARDS IN THE GLOBAL
TRADING SYSTEM, 57 (2001).
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B. THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM
As the brief historical exegesis of the trade/labor linkage in
the introduction to this Article makes clear, a major motivation
for promoting international labor standards in the first place
and then subsequently a trade policy-labor standards linkage 35
is that low labor standards (including low wages) in exporting
countries may undermine higher labor standards in importing
countries and precipitate a so-called "race to the bottom"-a
form of prisoner's dilemma-that can only be pre-empted by in-
ternational agreement on and enforcement of minimum labor
standards. 36
This argument is a variant on the unfair competition argu-
ment reviewed above. But rather than assuming that importing
countries will maintain the status quo with respect to their
more stringent labor standards and accept a loss of market
share, it instead assumes that such countries will progressively
dilute them in order to avoid losing market share to imports
from countries in which these standards are not adhered to.
This will result in a low level equilibrium trap where all coun-
tries relax their labor standards to what many regard as subop-
timal levels, yet all countries simply retain their preexisting
share of trade or investment after the race to the bottom has
run its course.
Despite the durability of this concern, for reasons given
above there is little reason to suppose that liberal trade and in-
vestment regimes will precipitate a race to the bottom. More-
over, the empirical evidence provides no support for the claim
that liberal international trade and investment regimes are
leading developed countries to relax their CLS or labor stan-
dards generally, or that foreign direct investors (FDI) are invest-
ing in countries with weak CLS.37 Indeed, the evidence suggests
that, with the notable exception of China, countries with weak
CLS attract very little FDI either in general or specifically in
the sectors where CLS are weak. Even Export Processing Zones
(EPZs) typically provide superior employment conditions to sur-
35. As, for example, reflected in the preambles to the ILO Constitution and
Havana Charter.
36. See Elissa Alben, GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410-47 (2001).
37. See generally Robert Flanagan, Labour Standards and International Com-
petitive Advantage, in INT'L LAB. STANDARDS (Robert J. Flanagan & William B.
Gould IV eds., 2003).
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rounding markets. 38 Some commentators, while conceding that
weak CLS in some developing countries have not caused a
weakening of labor standards generally in developed countries,
argue that developing countries with weak CLS that compete
against each other in export markets may be stuck in a low-level
equilibrium trap with respect to efforts to enhance CLS vis-h-vis
each other.39 If the OECD and later findings discussed above
are well-founded, this concern is not warranted. It is important
to emphasize that race-to-the-bottom concerns, like unfair com-
petition concerns, largely emanate from the perceived welfare
implications of non-compliance with international labor stan-
dards for citizens and interests in importing countries.40
C. CORE LABOR STANDARDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
Various core labor standards have been characterized as
human rights in the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the subsequent International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. The ILO's 1998 Declaration
of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work enumerates a
short list of core international labor standards which are defined
more fully in eight background Covenants that are incorporated
by reference: freedom of association and collective bargaining,
the elimination of forced labor, the elimination of child labor,
and the elimination of discrimination in employment. 41 These
rights are consistent with the characterization of certain core
labor standards or rights as human rights, especially those that
guarantee basic freedom of choice in employment relations.
As Amartya Sen argues in his recent book, Development As
Freedom,42 the basic goals of development can be conceived of in
universalistic terms where individual well-being can plausibly
38. See Maskus, supra note 27, at 11 (noting that "the preponderance of evi-
dence indicates that firms in EPZs pay higher wages and offer less onerous working
conditions than do firms in the remainder of the country."; see generally Brown, su-
pra note 27 at 50 (noting that wages in EPZs are higher than the rest of the econ-
omy)..
39. See generally Maskus, supra note 27 at 16; Kaushik Basu, The View from
the Tropics, in New Democracy Forum: Stepping Up Labour Standards, BOSTON
REV. (Feb/Mar 2001).
40. See Rodrik, supra note 26 at 81.
41. Fundamental Rights at Work: Overview and Prospects, International Labor
Organization Doc. 122, at 67 (2001), available at http://www/ilo.org/public/english/
dialogue/actrav/publ/122/122e.pdf (last visited February 24, 2005).
42. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 10-11 (1999).
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be viewed as entailing certain basic freedoms irrespective of cul-
tural context: freedom to engage in political criticism and asso-
ciation, freedom to engage in market transactions, freedom from
the ravages of preventable or curable disease, freedom from the
disabling effects of illiteracy and lack of basic education, and
freedom from extreme material privation. According to Sen,
these freedoms have both intrinsic and instrumental value. 43
Importantly, in contrast to the unfair competition and race-to-
the-bottom rationales for linking international trade policy and
international labor standards, the human rights perspective fo-
cuses primarily on the welfare of citizens in exporting, not im-
porting countries. The assumption underlying this concern with
basic or universal human rights is that failure to respect them
in any country either does not reflect the will of the citizens but
rather decisions of unrepresentative or repressive governments,
or alternatively majoritarian oppression of children, women, ra-
cial or religious minorities, or alternatively again paternalistic
concerns that citizens in other countries have made uninformed
or ill-advised choices to forego these basic rights.44
In our view, the linkage of international trade policy, in-
cluding trade or other economic sanctions, with core labor stan-
dards that reflect basic or universal human rights, is a cogent
one. When citizens in some countries observe gross or system-
atic abuses of human rights in other countries, the possible
range of reactions open to them include diplomatic protests,
withdrawal of ambassadors, cancellation of air landing rights,
trade sanctions or more comprehensive economic boycotts, or, at
the limit, military intervention. Arguing that doing nothing is
always or often the most appropriate response is inconsistent
with the very notion of universal human rights. In extreme
cases, such as war crimes, apartheid, the threat of chemical
warfare in the case of Iraq, genocide in the case of Serbia, or the
Holocaust in the case of Nazi Germany, excluding a priori eco-
nomic sanctions from the menu of possible options seems inde-
fensible. Whether it is the most appropriate option may, of
course, be context-specific and depend both on the seriousness of
the abuses and the likely efficacy of the response (choice of in-
strument issues to which we turn next). But it is sufficient for
present purposes to restate the point that to the extent that core
labor standards are appropriately characterized as basic or uni-
43. See id.
44. See Rodrik, supra note 26 at 66 ("Authoritarian regimes cannot make the
claim that their labor standards are reflective of broad social preferences.").
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versal human rights, a linkage between trade policy and such
labor standards is not only defensible, but arguably imperative,
in contrast to the other two rationales for such a linkage which,
despite their much longer historical lineage, are largely spuri-
ous and inconsistent with the central predicates of a liberal
trading system. Core labor standards viewed as basic or univer-
sal human rights, however, by promoting human freedom of
choice, are entirely consistent with a liberal trading regime that
seeks to ensure other human freedoms, in particular the right of
individuals to engage in market transactions with other indi-
viduals without discrimination on the basis of country of loca-
tion.45
Having said this, the scope and definition of the class of
human rights viewed as sufficiently universal as to warrant po-
tentially the imposition of trade sanctions for their violation is
problematic in various respects. Even CLS are not susceptible
to non-contentious understandings of their scope. Should child
labor be defined only in terms of a minimum working age or
should some subset of exploitative child labor practices be tar-
geted? What practices exactly constitute discrimination in the
workplace? What constitutes forced labor beyond slavery?
When is freedom of association and the right to engage in collec-
tive bargaining fully respected, given that most countries deny
or limit the right to strike in various contexts? Beyond CLS,
while civil rights (e.g., to be free from genocide, apartheid, tor-
ture, detention without trial) may be reasonably well-
understood and commonly subscribed to (at least in principle),
political rights (e.g., to engage in political association, criticism
or dissent or even to vote) are much less widely recognized.4 6
Economic, social and cultural rights, are even less universally
accepted.4 7 These issues have major implications for the choice
of instrument and choice of institutional arrangements for
structuring the trade policy-labor standards linkage, to which
we turn below.
45. See Molatlhegi, supra note 1, at ch. 3; see generally Sarah H. Cleveland,
Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, J.
INT'L ECON L. 133; McCrudden & Davies, supra note 10.
46. See generally Stirling, supra note 9.
47. See generally The Politics of Human Rights, ECONOMIST MAG., Aug. 18,
2001, at 9; "Human Rights" 18 et seq; MICHAEL IGNATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AS
POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (2001).
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II. THE CHOICE OF INSTRUMENT
A. ILO CONVENTIONS AND "SOFT" OR VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES
The ILO's promulgation and promotion of Conventions on
minimum international labor standards are the most prominent
form of law in this context, in that they depend on ratification
by individual member states and are subject only to investiga-
tion and reporting by ILO organs and the provision of technical
assistance to enable countries to build capacity to implement
them. Thus, compliance with ILO norms depends on a combina-
tion of public identification, embarrassment and shaming (a
mild stick), and technical assistance to promote compliance (a
mild carrot). The ILO has been widely criticized by proponents
of a trade/labor linkage for ineffective enforcement of its norms
and indeed variable ratification of its Conventions by many
countries, including major developed countries such as the
United States (which has, of course, been a prominent propo-
nent of a trade/labor linkage).48 Many of the "soft" market-
driven mechanisms described below have emerged in part out of
frustration by non-governmental organizations (NGO) and other
interest groups with the ineffectiveness of the ILO.
One class of "soft" instruments entails a range of certifica-
tion, labeling, and voluntary code of conduct mechanisms that
purport to identify firms or products that conform to core inter-
national labor standards and hence are responsive to informa-
tion market failures if consumers in importing countries derive
private disutility from consuming goods produced in violation of
CLS. 49 The efficacy of these mechanisms turn largely on market
reactions to the signals that they entail, principally by consum-
ers and to a lesser extent by investors. These instruments are
attractive in some respects in their focus on consumer (not pro-
ducer) welfare in importing countries in that they depend on
consumer preferences and a willingness to pay to vindicate
those preferences and hence are consistent with the normative
predicate of liberal trade theory, which largely focuses on the
48. See Maskus, supra note 27, at 55 ("The ILO has resisted the notion of in-
ternational enforcement of its convention on grounds that doing so could severely
limit ratification and push many countries out of the organization altogether.").
49. See generally Richard Freeman, A Hard-Headed Look at Labour Standards,
in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM at 32 (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Interna-
tional Labour Affairs ed. 1994).
[Vol. 14:2
TRADE POLICY & LABOR STANDARDS
potential for free trade to enhance consumer welfare. Typically,
such mechanisms are either self-initiated by firms or industry
associations or are initiated by NGOs of various kinds, who ne-
gotiate them with firms or trade associations. The most ambi-
tious initiative of this kind to date is the Global Compact,
launched by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 and en-
tailing voluntary corporate endorsements of nine principles, in-
cluding CLS.50 Among the most prominent scholarly advocates
of voluntary approaches are Archon Fung, Dara O'Rourke, and
Charles Sabel, who argue for a strategy which they refer to as
"Ratcheting Labor Standards."51 This strategy would entail an
ambitious program of information gathering and monitoring of
firms, which would be systematically compared with their peers
operating in the same part of the world in terms of labor rights
performance. Assuming that consumers in rich countries will
reward firms that do better than their competitors and engage
in "best practices," Fung, O'Rourke and Sabel argue that if the
monitoring and evaluation program is credible, firms will start
to compete with each other with respect to labor standards per-
formance, thus ratcheting up those standards.5 2
In August 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights unanimously
adopted the "Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights," which seeks to provide a universal framework
for corporate responsibility, guiding the many uncoordinated ex-
isting voluntary initiatives. 53 In respect of rights of workers, the
norms prohibit forced or compulsory labor, economic exploita-
tion of children (which notably falls short of a prohibition of
child labor as such), the obligation to provide a "safe and
healthy working environment," and to provide workers "with
remuneration that ensures an adequate standard of living for
50. The Global Compact, at http://www.unglobalcompact.orgPortal/Default.
asp? (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
51. Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continu-
ous Improvement in the Global Workplace, (2000), at http:// www.law.columbia.edu/
sabel/papers/ratchPO.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
52. See Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards, 26 BOSTON REV.,
Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. But see Robin Broad et al., A Step Up for Workers?, 26 BOSTON
REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 11 (responding critically to Fung's article by, among others,
Mark Levinson and Ian Ayres).
53. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights, Fifty-fifth session, Agenda item 4 available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.
En?Opendocument (last visited February 24, 2005).
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them and their families," and freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining. 54 The content of these rights is linked to vari-
ous binding international human rights instruments, both of the
ILO and the United Nations.
"Soft" or voluntary approaches suffer from a number of limi-
tations. Currently, they apparently apply to a small percentage
of exports in a number of sectors where non-compliance with
core labor standards is thought to be common (e.g., about five
percent of exports in the textile and clothing industries), and
they vary widely in various dimensions: for example, i) which
core labor standards are recognized; ii) how these core labor
standards are defined, if at all; iii) and how effectively adher-
ence to these standards is monitored, if at all.55 In explaining
the low, inconsistent, and often ineffective application of these
mechanisms, a number of explanations suggest themselves
which in turn raise serious questions about attaching primacy to
consumer preferences in importing countries in this context, de-
spite the initial appeal of mechanisms that depend on consumer
welfare as their reference point and the compatibility of this ref-
erence point with the normative predicates of free trade. 56
First, consumers, even if fully informed about conditions under
which imports are being produced and violations of core interna-
tional labor standards that particular modes of production may
entail, in fact do not care enough about the intrinsic values re-
flected in these core labor standards (viewed as basic or univer-
sal human rights) to put their money where their mouth is.
However, even if this were to be the case, the fact that the proc-
ess of production and exchange may entail production or con-
sumption externalities for other citizens in exporting or import-
ing countries, as is largely inherent in the notion of universal
human rights, suggests that consumer preferences cannot be de-
cisive in a human rights context.
A second explanation is that consumers in importing coun-
tries do care about these human rights values but are poorly in-
54. Id.
55. See generally Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the
Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 410-23 (2001) (comparing perfect costless monitoring and
imperfect monitoring); Janelle Diller, A Social Conscience in the Global Market-
place? Labour Dimensions of Codes of Conduct, Social Labelling and Investor Initia-
tives, 138 INT'L LAB. REV. 99 (1999); Drusilla K. Brown, Can Consumer Product La-
bels Deter Foreign Child Labour Exploitation? (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Department of Economics, Tufts University).
56. See Basu, supra note 39.
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formed about the conditions under which the goods they are
consuming are produced in exporting countries. The cost of ac-
quiring this information exceeds the value that they place on
this information. In this respect, the voluntary and decentral-
ized nature of the soft law mechanisms currently employed in
this context almost certainly exacerbates the information prob-
lems faced by consumers in importing countries. As noted
above, the proposal by the Director-General of the ILO in 1997
that the ILO should promote an integrated scheme for increas-
ing the effectiveness of consumer choice by labeling exports as
having been produced in countries that conform to core interna-
tional labor standards was rejected by the main decision-making
body of the ILO, in large part because of strenuous opposition
from developing countries.6 7
Yet a further explanation for the low, inconsistent, and of-
ten ineffective application of these mechanisms is that consum-
ers in importing countries do care about these intrinsic human
rights values but confront serious collective action problems.
For instance, individual consumers who may be prepared to pay
a premium for goods produced in conditions that meet core labor
standards will be concerned that other consumers who share
their concerns may opportunistically purchase lower-priced
goods while relying on other consumers to bear the financial
costs of vindicating their collective preferences. If, however,
every consumer suspects every other consumer of being likely to
behave opportunistically, an effective voluntary collective re-
sponse may not emerge.
A recent major World Bank study examined the relatively
modest results attained so far through voluntary corporate re-
sponsibility.58 The study came to the following conclusion,
based on consultations with the various stakeholders in such
schemes, including businesses:
Overall, the consultations, and subsequent analysis, indicate that
while meaningful progress has been made in apparel, and to a lesser
degree in agriculture, the existing 'system' of implementation may be
reaching its limits in terms of its ability to deliver further sustainable
improvements in social and environmental workplace standards. This
in some ways is natural when one considers that current approaches
are not the result of a systematic effort to marshal the forces of the
public and private sectors, trade unions and NGOs, and workers. In-
57. See supra, note 10.
58. WORLD BANK GROUP, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICE,
STRENGTHENING IMPLEMENTATION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS (2003).
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stead, it is clear from the consultations that current efforts are the re-
sult of a series of steps often taken through ad hoc and isolated deci-
sions. 59
Beyond these reasons for not according primacy to con-
sumer preferences in this context, a further serious limitation is
associated with soft law mechanisms that link consumer re-
sponses to imports of offending goods, e.g., goods made with
child or forced labor, conflict diamonds. These mechanisms are
unresponsive to violations of either core labor standards viewed
as universal human rights or universal human rights defined
more broadly that are occurring in non-traded goods sectors.
For example, it is widely agreed that most child labor is not em-
ployed in export sectors (between five and ten percent) but
rather, in domestic agriculture, services, retail and the informal
sector generally.6 0 Many abuses of civil and political human
rights are not related in any direct way to traded goods sectors,
such as civil rights abuses in Sudan and Burma, to take two
current examples.
B. HARD LAW OPTIONS
The first and most fundamental issue that arises in choos-
ing hard law instruments is the scope of the trade policy-labor
standards linkage. If we conceptualize at least core labor stan-
dards as universal human rights, how can we justify privileging
these particular human rights over at least some subset of uni-
versally proclaimed universal human rights (subject to the defi-
nitional issues noted above)? Surely genocide, torture, and de-
tention without trial warrant at least as serious concern from
the international community, and at least as serious a set of le-
gal sanctions, as violations of core international labor standards.
To privilege core labor standards over these other human rights
is quite overtly to elide the various normative rationales for in-
tervention reviewed earlier in this paper and to risk a protec-
tionist rationale for trade or other economic sanctions.
Related to this point, a further issue arises relating to the
scope of the linkage between trade policy and core labor stan-
dards: Why should trade or other economic sanctions be contin-
gent on imports of offending goods? As in the discussion of
market-driven soft law instruments and limitations thereof,
59. See id.
60. See PETER MORICI & EvAN SCHULZ, LABOR STANDARDS IN THE GLOBAL
TRADING SYSTEM 34 (2001).
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why should child labor in non-tradable goods sectors or human
rights violations in non-tradable goods sectors warrant any less
concern, or any less severe sanctions, than such abuses in trad-
able goods sectors?
It follows from these two points that in our view, trade or
other economic sanctions should not be confined to core labor
standards, but should extend to at least some subset of univer-
sally accepted rights more generally, and that such sanctions
should not be limited to imports of goods directly produced by
the offending practices. This in fact suggests a very broad do-
main for linking trade and other economic sanctions with uni-
versal human rights. It also suggests, however, some significant
constraints on their invocation. In particular, both the substan-
tive rules governing their invocation and the procedures by
which they may be invoked should be consistent with the hu-
man rights rationale for intervention and should exclude the un-
fair competition and race to the bottom rationales for interven-
tion.
In terms of substantive rules, this requirement assigns con-
siderable significance to rules of non-discrimination and consis-
tency. For example, suppose hypothetically that it is the case
that the United States has no textile sector but a significant
clothing sector and that child labor is employed in producing ex-
ports for the U.S. market in India in both sectors but the United
States seeks to impose trade sanctions only against clothing im-
ports from India and not textile imports. Alternatively, even if
the United States seeks to apply trade sanctions against both
clothing and textile imports from India, it may not seek to do so
against similar imports from Pakistan made with child labor for
geopolitical or other reasons. While it is important to screen out
cases of disguised protectionism in cases where trade sanctions
have been unilaterally invoked, ostensibly on human rights
grounds, this should not require sanctioning countries either to
apply sanctions to all countries in violation of CLS (or human
rights), or none-an all-or-nothing requirement that is likely to
make "the perfect enemy of the good." In other words, as a mat-
ter of international trade law there should be a negative duty
not to discriminate for protectionist reasons, but there should be
no positive duty to take affirmative action.
While a sanctioning country may choose not to sanction all
violations of CLS (or human rights) everywhere in the world,
this form of trade sanction "under-reach" should surely not be a
legitimate concern of an international trade body, which cannot
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plausibly be transformed into a global human rights crusader.
In contrast, the problem of sanction "under-reach" may be a le-
gitimate concern of other international organizations (such as
the ILO, or UN Human Rights Committees), but this calls for
action on their part (such as by adopting a regime like the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species, requir-
ing multilateral sanctions by members in particular cases).
For the WTO, the principal concern is sanction "over-reach,"
where the sanctioning country's actions in targeting some im-
ports and not others seems principally explicable on the basis
that in the former case it has a domestic industry to protect and
in the latter case it does not. Where it imposes trade sanctions
in the latter case, they entail no costs to the domestic producers
of competitive products (who are nonexistent), but costs to do-
mestic consumers. Such action can be viewed as an action
against material interest that can only be explained by the sanc-
tioning country's genuine concern with CLS (or human rights)
violations in exporting countries (similarly in the case of bans on
exports or foreign direct investment), where the government of
the sanctioning state, by taking action, is seeking to solve collec-
tive action problems among its own consumers or citizens. On
this approach, as indicated in the hypothetical example above,
the differential treatment of clothing and textile imports from
India would be suspect, but the failure to sanction similar im-
ports from Pakistan, for non-trade related reasons, would not.
In terms of procedural requirements for the invocation of
trade or other economic sanctions against violations of universal
human rights in other countries, a number of options present
themselves. First, a basic choice has to be made (although often
overlooked in debates over the trade/labor standards linkage)
between sticks and carrots. Rather like the European Commu-
nity's GSP regime, it is not difficult to imagine developed coun-
tries offering developing countries significant trade concessions
if they commit themselves to an accelerated phase out of offend-
ing labor or other human rights abuses. Unlike the Uruguay
Round Agreements, which entailed for the most part a single
undertaking by Member States, such an arrangement in this
context might more appropriately take the form of a plurilateral
agreement, in which trade concessions are an option offered to
developing countries and for those who choose it developed
countries would bind their trade concessions. The commitments
made by countries to observe core international labor standards
and other universal human rights would have to be reasonably
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precisely defined in terms of ILO or UN Conventions or Cove-
nants, so that violations of these commitments could be ren-
dered reasonably justiciable through an appropriate interna-
tional dispute settlement process. One of the limitations of the
carrot option, as pointed out by Howard Chang,61 however, is
that it creates moral hazard problems in that countries may
persist in violations or engage in more egregious violations in
order to attract larger concessions (or carrots).
A second option would be to require all countries that are
parties to either a regional or multilateral arrangement like the
WTO to commit themselves to effectively enforcing their own ex-
isting labor laws (as under the NAFTA Labor Side Accord), with
enforcement provided through supranational or international
dispute settlement processes and penalties. The limitations of
this option are obvious enough: first, it addresses only violations
of core international labor standards and not other universal
human rights; second, it assumes that member countries have
already enacted substantive laws that reflect these standards
and that the only problem is ineffective enforcement, which in
many cases may not be the central problem.
A third option is to allow private party-initiated petitions
for trade sanctions under domestic law analogous to anti-
dumping duties and countervailing duties. We unequivocally
reject this option as espousing in its most naked form the two
rationales for a trade/labor standards linkage that we regard as
illegitimate and as carrying the highest risk of protectionist
abuse of this linkage.
A fourth option would be unilateral state action against im-
ports from offending countries. This option is possible based
upon the Article XX exceptions in the GATT,62 as will be ex-
plained in the next section of this paper. Article XX contains
important disciplines to prevent measures that are disguised
protectionism or have arbitrary elements. It would be expected,
that were a WTO Member to justify such action under Article
XX, the dispute settlement organs of the WTO would rely heav-
ily on the judgment of the ILO and/or UN human rights organs
in determining the seriousness of the situation to which the uni-
lateral sanctions are a response. This would also be expected in
determining whether the sanctioning state-and the interna-
tional community-have exhausted less trade restricting alter-
61. See Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities, 17
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 309, 312-15 (1997).
62. See generally GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262.
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natives.
An example of how such an option might work is the cur-
rent ban by the United States on all trade with Burma, based
upon grave labor and human rights abuses by the current mili-
tary junta.63 In 2000, in response to the complete failure of the
Burmese regime to respond to the recommendations of an ILO
Inquiry into labor rights abuses, for the first time in its history,
the ILO invoked Article 33 of its constitution, which allows the
membership collectively to authorize or encourage compliance
measures against a member by other members. In this case,
ILO Members were
to review, in the light of the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry,
the relations that they may have with the member State concerned
and take appropriate measures to ensure that the said Member cannot
take advantage of such relations to perpetuate or extend the system of
forced compulsory labor referred to by the Commission of Inquiry, and
to contribute as far as possible to the implementation of its recommen-
dations. 64
In 2003, the United States Congress adopted the Burmese
Freedom and Democracy Act (2003), and cited in the preamble
the above recommendation of the ILO.6 5 This Act banned all
trade with Burma, but gave the President discretion to modify
or lift the ban in the case of adequate progress towards the re-
spect of core labor rights, inter alia.6 6 Notably, the legislation
requires the President to consult with the Secretary General of
the ILO in exercising his discretion under the Act;67 the as-
sumption is that the future of U.S. sanctions should be linked to
multilateral judgments about the situation in Burma.
After the legislation passed virtually unanimously in both
Houses and was signed into law by President Bush, very little
international criticism was directed at the United States for its
ban, including among delegates at the WTO. The legislation
was not even mentioned by name in the recent Trade Policy Re-
view of the United States in the WTO.6 8 The absence of criti-
63. See Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub.L. 108-61, §§ 1 to 9,
50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (amended 2003) [hereinafter BFDA].
64. International Labor Organization, International Labor Conference: Provi-
sional Record, Eighty-eighth Session, Geneva, 2000, available at http://www.ilo.org/
public/englishstandards/relm/ilc/ilc88/pr-4.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
65. See generally BFDA, supra note 63.
66. See id. at §3b.
67. See id.
68. See generally World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: United
States, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr e/tp226_e.htm (Jan. 16,
2004).
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cism suggests that there is tolerance of unilateral action by the
international community where that action is preceded by a
clear multilateral determination that the country concerned is
an egregious violator of core labor rights and that cooperative
approaches for addressing the situation have been exhausted.
Another factor is that the activist community within Burma, in-
cluding the opposition leader, who had been put once again un-
der house arrest, strongly supported the sanctions; they could
thus not be characterized as the imperialistic imposition of
"Western" values.
A fifth option would be for all member states who are par-
ties to either regional or multilateral trading arrangements to
negotiate a comprehensive set of rules setting out commitments
to observe core international labor standards and other univer-
sal human rights. On this approach, which is analogous in some
respects to that entailed in the Uruguay Round TRIPS Agree-
ment, 69 trade sanctions would come at the end of the dispute
settlement process and not at the beginning. In other words, a
country complaining that another country was in violation of its
core labor standards or other human rights commitment would
have to demonstrate a breach of these commitments and would
carry the burden of initiating a complaint and proving such vio-
lations, and only if the complaint is upheld by the dispute set-
tlement body could retaliatory trade sanctions be authorized in
the event that non-compliance continued. This approach has
several virtues: first, trade sanctions cannot be imposed until
there has been a multilateral judgment that a violation of rele-
vant core international labor standards or other human rights
has occurred, and the country seeking to impose such sanctions
bears the initial burden of initiating a complaint and proving a
prima facie case. Second, it has the virtue of any rule-based
system of laying out the substantive ground rules with some
precision in advance and thus minimizes the potential for pro-
tectionist abuse of the regime. Third, and relatedly, it renders
problems of justiciability more tractable.
III. THE CHOICE OF INSTITUTIONAL REGIME
Having discussed the choice of objectives and the choice of
69. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [here-
inafter TRIPS], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUARY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
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instruments in the light of those objectives in shaping a
trade/labor standards linkage, the remaining question is the
choice of institutions to administer this linkage in the light of
choice of objectives and choice of instruments. Two important
and related considerations are relevant here: first, institutional
specialization, as in many other domains, has many virtues in
vindicating desired policy objectives;70 second, because human
rights, not trade effects, motivate the trade/labor linkage that
we advocate, vesting exclusive or even primary jurisdiction in
an international trade body risks compromising the normative
rationale for the linkage, e.g., by giving primacy to adverse
trade effects in either importing or exporting countries.
In cases of egregious abuses of universal civil human rights,
such as apartheid or genocide, it is difficult to imagine as plau-
sible the vesting of this function in a trade organization like the
WTO. Rather, following current international practices, one
would imagine that the appropriate international organ for au-
thorizing or perhaps requiring such sanctions is the UN Secu-
rity Council. In other less egregious cases, there will still obvi-
ously be questions of institutional legitimacy and competence in
vesting the administration of such a regime in a trade organiza-
tion. One option here entails a sharp and exclusive institutional
division of labor. For example, with respect to core labor stan-
dards, the authorization or requirement for the imposition of a
trade or other economic sanctions could be vested in the ILO by
way of elaboration of its sanctioning power under Article 33 of
the ILO Constitution. This would follow, by way of analogy, the
example of regimes such as CJTES, which requires signatory
states to ban imports of endangered species. Critics of the ILO,
however, are skeptical of the willingness or capacity of the ILO
to implement and administer effectively such a regime. Defend-
ers of the ILO, on the other hand, may worry that the attach-
ment of economic sanctions to the powers of the ILO may desta-
bilize the organization, causing states to withdraw from
membership or to withhold ratification of its Conventions to an
even greater extent than is the case at present.
Another option is to imagine some form of horizontal coor-
dination among international agencies, whereby the ILO would
be wholly or largely responsible for determinations of systematic
70. See T. N. Srinivasan, International Trade and Labour Standards from an
Economic Perspective, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
219, 221-22 (Pitou van Dijck & Gerrit Faber eds., 1990) (describing creation of agen-
cies that set the rules governing international economic transactions).
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and persistent violations of core labor standards, UN Commit-
tees on Human Rights determinations of systematic and persis-
tent violations of other universal human rights (other than the
most egregious abuses), and the WTO would be responsible for
overseeing the implementation of sanctions and ensuring that
arbitrary and unjustifiable forms of discrimination and dis-
guised protectionism are avoided, as well as proportionality in
the scale of the trade sanctions imposed. A variant on this op-
tion would be to have international organizations such as the
ILO or UN Human Rights Committees nominate members to
dispute settlement panels or the Appellate Body of the WTO in
cases involving complaints of violations of core labor standards
or other universal human rights, and at the same time take
steps to render WTO dispute settlement process both more
transparent and more inclusive in terms of admissibility of
amicus curiae briefs from interested members of civil society.71
Our preference would be for some form of horizontal coordi-
nation with specialized international agencies with expertise
and legitimacy in the labor standards or human rights fields
which would make determinations of systematic and persistent
violations of relevant norms despite whatever carrots and sticks
(assisting and shaming) that the agency typically first brings to
bear on violators. Thus, the "necessity" test under Article XX
would largely fall within these agencies' domains, although such
determinations may be precipitated by unilateral state trade ac-
tion under one of the options reviewed in the previous section
and a complaint by the targeted country. A reference under the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (Article 13) by the
WTO panel seized with the complaint, should be made to a rele-
vant specialized international agency for findings on violations
of relevant international norms. The WTO panel should accept
these agencies' determination as presumptively dispositive of
the referenced issues. Indeed, this option becomes much more
attractive with this form of horizontal co-ordination. Such de-
termination may also go some distance toward meeting the non-
discrimination/disguised discrimination conditions in the cha-
peau to Article XX of the GATT.72 With respect to the propor-
tionality of the proposed trade response, the WTO for its part
should again be influenced by the nature of the horizontal
71. See MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ch. 4 (3d ed. 2005).
72. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 [here-
inafter GATT Art. 1].
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agency's findings as to the seriousness and persistence of viola-
tions.
Because adverse trade effects are irrelevant in our proposed
framework of analysis, trade sanctions cannot be quantified in
these terms. Here, more imaginative fashioning of trade reme-
dies is called for. For example, the NAFTA Labor Side Accord
provides for a system of fines, ultimately enforceable by trade
sanctions, if a member state is found by a specialized panel to
have engaged in a systematic and persistent practice of not en-
forcing its own labor laws, with the fine payable to the offending
country to enhance its labor law enforcement.7 3 This form of
sanction suggests one option. Another option may entail denial
of access to the dispute settlement process of the WTO as a
complainant for so long as a member state is non-compliant. A
yet further option is suspension of voting rights in the WTO
while non-compliance persists. Crippling a non-compliant coun-
try, particularly a poor developing country, economically with
trade sanctions should be reserved as the remedy of last resort.
IV. THE EXISTING AND EVOLVING LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
In the Havana Charter, which was to be the blueprint for
the failed International Trade Organization (ITO), there was a
stipulation that Members were to take measures against "unfair
labour conditions." 74 The GATT contains no explicit provision
either permitting or requiring trade action against labor rights
violations. Article XX(e), however, permits otherwise GATT-
inconsistent measures "relating to the products of prison la-
bour."75
73. Under Annex 39 of NAFTA, any monetary enforcement assessment shall be
no greater than $1 million (U.S.) for the first year of the Agreement and thereafter
no greater than .007 percent of total trade between the Parties during the most re-
cent year for which data are available and must be paid into a fund to improve or
enhance labor law enforcement in the Party complained against. See North Ameri-
can Agreement on Labor Cooperation, done Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Mex.-Can., Annex
39, 32 I.L.M. 1499,1516.
74. See generally Final Act and Related Documents of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc.
ICITO/1/4 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter].
75. See GATT, supra note 72, at Article XX(e).
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In determining the legality of labor-rights related trade
measures under the WTO framework, it is important to distin-
guish between four kinds of measures: trade measures that con-
dition imports on the labor conditions under which specific
products are manufactured (for instance a ban on rugs manufac-
tured with exploitative child labor); sanctions agains a specific
country or countries (the U.S. ban on trade with Burma, men-
tioned above); labelling, voluntary codes of conduct and associ-
ated monitoring mechanisms; GSP preferences linked to labor
rights performance.
The first kind of measure treats products differently based
upon circumstances surrounding their production. Under Arti-
cle I of the GATT, every WTO Member is required to provide
unconditional most favoured nation treatment to every other
WTO Member, with respect to "like products."76 The Belgian
Family Allowances ruling is often cited for the proposition that
this requirement of unconditionality excludes the possibility of
distinguishing between products based upon labor conditions. 77
The Belgian Family Allowances case, however, dealt with condi-
tionality based on the system of social protection adopted by
particular countries. It was thus not origin-neutral and, in fact,
closer to the second kind of measure identified above. In the
adopted Canada-Autos report, the panel held that non-
discriminatory, i.e., non-origin based conditions were permissi-
ble even with respect to 'ike" products under Art. I:
We therefore do not believe that, as argued by Japan, the word 'uncon-
ditionally' in Article 1:1 must be interpreted to mean that making an
advantage conditional on criteria not related to the imported product
itself is per se inconsistent with Article 1:1, irrespective of whether or
not such criteria relate to the origin of the imported products.
78
On the other hand, a more recent panel, the EC-GSP panel,
discussed in more detail below, without even so much as a cita-
tion to Canada-Autos, took a very different approach to uncondi-
tionality in Art. 1:1, holding that it excluded even origin-neutral
conditions;79 this ruling is now on appeal to the Appellate Body.
On the Canada-Autos approach, a genuinely (both de jure and
76. See GATT, supra note 72, at art. I, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262.
77. See generally Belgian Family Allowances, Nov. 7, 1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st
Supp.) at 59 (1953).
78. Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, Report of
the Panel, Feb. 11, 2000, WTO Doc. WT/DS142/R (2000) [hereinafter Canada-Autos].
79. EC GSP Scheme Under Debate and Review, BRIDGES WEEKLY, Jan. 21,
2004, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-01-21/storyl.htm.
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de facto) origin-neutral condition related to respect for core labor
rights in the production of a product might well be found not to
violate Art. 1:1, even if products produced in violation of such
rights were found to be "like" those that are not (an issue we
will explore in more detail below, when we discuss National
Treatment under the GATT).8 ° On the EC-GSP panel approach,
there would clearly be a violation of Art. 1:1, thus requiring that
the measure be justified under an exception in Art. XX of the
GATT.
Art. 111:4 of the GATT requires that imported "products" re-
ceive treatment no less favorable than that to be afforded to
"like" imported products (the National Treatment principle).81
A longstanding issue in GATT and WTO jurisprudence is
whether products may be considered "unlike" based upon proc-
ess and production methods. In the Asbestos case the WTO Ap-
pellate Body set forth a framework for evaluating whether
products are "like" under Art. III:4;82 this framework neither
explicitly endorses nor rejects the idea that process and produc-
tion methods are relevant to the assessment of likeness. How-
ever, the Appellate Body's reasoning strongly suggests that
products may be considered "like" or "unlike" based on consumer
tastes and habits. Thus, if there is sufficient evidence that con-
sumers distinguish between products produced in conditions
violating CLS and those produced in conditions consistent with
CLS, or would distinguish these products if they had perfect in-
formation, then the former products might well be found to be
"unlike" the latter. It should be noted that in the Asbestos case
the Appellate Body emphasized that the principle of avoiding
protectionism stated in Art. III:l should inform determinations
of "likeness."83  Thus, in evaluating factors such as consumer
preferences, the dispute settlement organs will be attentive to
the possibility of protectionist manipulation or abuse as ingredi-
ents in product-based labor-rights trade measures.
However, even if products produced in conditions that vio-
late CLS were found to be "like" products not produced in such
conditions, in order to establish a violation of Art. III:4 it would
80. See Canada-Autos, supra note 78.
81. See GATT supra note 72, at Art. III:4.
82. See WTO Appellate Body Report: European Communities - Measures Affect-
ing Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, Mar. 12, 2001,
available at http://docsonline.wto.orgDDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/135ABR.doc [herein-
after Asbestos AB Report].
83. Id.
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be necessary to show that the difference in treatment between
"like" products leads to less favorable treatment of the "group" of
imported products in relation to the "group" of like domestic
products.8 4 In the case of CLS, it might well be difficult to show
such less favorable treatment of imports, since all ILO Mem-
bers, and thus essentially all WTO Members, are equally obliged
to conform with CLS; thus, such a condition is not, by definition,
"less favorable" to exports, since exporting countries are just as
bound to ensure such rights are respected as importing coun-
tries.
By contrast to product-related measures of the kind just de-
scribed, sanctions targetted at particular countries that violate
CLS are very likely to be found to contravene Art. I of the
GATT, since they discriminate based on the country of origin of
the goods; it might be argued the discrimination is nevertheless
based on origin-neutral criteria, namely CLS themselves. This
argument, however, would only be persuasive if the importing
country were to ban trade from all countries that run afoul of
CLS, regardless of other factors, including geo-political consid-
erations, which, as argued above, it would be unrealistic to ex-
pect. Further, a general import ban would be a violation of Art.
XI of the GATT, which outlaws prohibitions and quantitative re-
strictions on trade. Thus, such an import ban would need to be
justified by the importing country under Art. XX.
The possibility has been raised that Article XX(a), which
permits otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures "necessary to
protect public morals," might be invoked to justify trade sanc-
tions against products that involve the use of child labor or the
denial of basic workers' rights.8 5 In its ruling in Shrimp/Turtle I
that Art. XX can be, in principle, used to justify measures that
condition imports on other countries' policies, the AB went be-
yond the case of Art. XX(g) ("exhaustible natural resources")
which was at issue in that case and explicitly mentioned, inter
alia, Art. XX(a).86 There is no GATT or WTO jurisprudence on
the interpretation of Art. XX(a), and the reference to prison la-
bor in Art. XX(e), as well as the fact that explicit language on
84. Id. at para. 100.
85. See generally C.T. FEDDERSEN, DER ORDRE PUBLIC IN DER WTO:
AUSLEGUNG UND BEDEUTUNG DES ART. XX. LIT. A) GATT IM RAHMAN DER WTO-
STRETBEILEGUNG (Duncker and Humbolt, Berlin 2002).
86. WTO Appellate Body Report: United States- Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Turtle Products, WT/DS58/ABR, Oct. 12, 1998 (adopted Nov. 6, 1998),
38 I.L.M. 118, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/tUWT/DS/
58ABR.doc [hereinafter Shrimp AB Report].
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labor rights was in the failed Havana Charter, arguably sug-
gests that if the GATT Art. XX had been designed to encompass
sanctions with respect to labor rights, explicit language would
have been used to articulate such an exception. This being said,
the interpretation of public morals should not be frozen in time,
and with the evolution of human rights as a core element in
public morality in many post-war societies and at the interna-
tional level the content of public morals should extend to uni-
versal human rights, including labor rights. This view is consis-
tent with a dynamic interpretation of Art. XX of the kind which
the Appellate Body gave to Art. XX(g) in the Shrimp/Turtle
case. Furthermore, in early 2004 the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights was preparing a study on
"public morals" and human rights.8 7 In the modern world, the
very idea of public morality has become inseparable from the
concern for human personhood, dignity, and capacity reflected
in fundamental rights. A conception of public morals or moral-
ity that excluded notions of fundamental rights would simply be
contrary to the ordinary contemporary meaning of the concept.
As interpreted by the AB in Shrimp/Trtle, the chapeau of
Art. XX provides an important check against protectionist or
other abusive implementation of trade bans for ostensible labor
rights purposes.88 In determining whether measures in ques-
tion are applied so as to constitute arbitrary or unjustified dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on international trade, the
AB would examine factors such as whether a trade ban inap-
propriately singles out the target country, whereas other coun-
tries might, against the objective criteria in question, merit
similar treatment. Here it would be important to determine
whether the labor rights situation in the particular countries in
question has been singled out as especially grave or warranting
particular atttention by the international community, including
the ILO and the UN human rights organs.8 9 Here, it should be
emphasized that the chapeau only prohibits arbitrary and un-
justified discrimination against countries where the same condi-
tions prevail-not all discrimination. Thus, a sanctions-
imposing state might still justify singling out one target country
and not including others where the labor rights situation is
similarly grave, by citing geo-political or other principled policy
87. See Charnovitz, supra note 1; Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement
and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 753 (2002).
88. Shrimp AB Report, supra note 86, at paras. 148-186.
89. It will be recalled that this was clearly the case with Burma.
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reasons why it would be inappropriate to ban trade from the
other countries in question.
Further, the import ban must be "necessary" for the protec-
tion of public morals, according to the terms of Art. XX(a). 90 The
concept of "necessity" as elaborated by the AB in the EC Asbes-
tos and Korea Beef cases in relation to other paragraphs of Art.
XX where the word "necessary" appears, has a bifurcated struc-
ture. A measure may be necessary if it is "indispensable" to
achieving the objective in question, which entails an examina-
tion of whether there is any reasonably available less trade re-
strictive alternative. Since, as discussed above, often a range of
less restrictive alternative instruments might exist to address
non-compliance with CLS, it would be up to the state seeking to
justify its ban to show that these instruments have proven, or
are likely to prove ineffective. To return to the example of
Burma again, such a requirement might well be met where the
ILO itself has essentially declared that other available alterna-
tives to induce a country to engage with the international com-
munity concerning its labor rights practices have failed. A sec-
ond version of the "necessity" test applies where the measure in
question cannot be shown to be indispensable, but nevertheless
has a close relationship to the given objective, here protection of
public morals. In this latter instance, a further requirement is
imposed, namely to show that the trade restricting effect of the
measure is not out of all proportion to the achievement of its ob-
jective.
With respect to the third type of measure, voluntary label-
ling or other code of conduct based approaches to achieving CLS
compliance through consumer action, generally the GATT itself
does not apply where there is no element of mandatory govern-
ment action (albeit GATT norms may extend to indirect manda-
tory action, such as "informal guidance" by governments to in-
dustry that they implicitly may face various kinds of informal
sanctions for not complying with).91
These approaches, however, may be disciplined under the
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT), which requires
90. GATT art. XX.
91. See WTO panel report: Japan- Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic
Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, Mar. 31, 1998, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/44R00.wpf; GATT Panel Report: Panel on Import, Distri-
bution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies,
L/6304, Mar. 22, 1988, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/JCR/
PANELS/85LIQUOR.wpf.
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WTO Members to ensure that voluntary standard setting exer-
cises comply with a Code of Good Practice. 92 This Code, inter
alia, entails that voluntary standards be based on relevant in-
ternational standards, and that setting of standards and moni-
toring of compliance in voluntary systems not constitute protec-
tionism, and be undertaken so as to avoid unnecessary obstacles
to trade. While no clear definition of international standards is
given in the TBT, an international standards setting body is de-
fined as an organization open to all WTO Members. 93 Based on
this definition, both ILO Conventions and the Declaration on
Core Labour Standards would constitute "international stan-
dards" within the meaning of TBT, as would the recently pro-
claimed UN norms of corporate responsibility, discussed above.
The fourth kind of measure, GSP preferences conditioned on
labor rights performance, is already used extensively by both
the United States and the European Union. Recently, India
challenged a relatively new aspect of the EU scheme, namely a
provision that gave a further additional margin of preference to
those developing countries able to certify that CLS were being
effectively implemented in their domestic law and regulations. 94
India also challenged a related scheme for environmental per-
formance, and drug enforcement. In the end, India dropped the
claims about the labor (and environmental) preferences, limiting
its argument to drug preferences. The Panel ultimately ruled
that under Art. 1:1 of the GATT, and also under the Enabling
Clause, which provides an exception from Art. I:l for GSP, de-
veloped countries must, with a few narrow exceptions, treat all
developing countries the same in respect of GSP preferences
(except for the least-developed, which may be offered a larger
margin of preference). 95 This ruling would carry the implication
that preferences conditioned on labor rights performance violate
Art. I, and cannot be saved by the Enabling Clause, and thus
would have to be justified under Art. XX. The panel ruling in
question, however, is presently under appeal.
B. INTERNAL TRADE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
92. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994., available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/17-tbte.htm. The Code of Good Practice
can be found in Annex 3 to the Agreement.
93. Id. at Annex 1 para. 4.
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EUROPEAN UNION
U.S. trade law provides for withdrawal of trade concessions
with respect to countries that fail to respect international work-
ers' rights. For example, Section 301 of the U.S. Trade and Tar-
iff Act of 1974 as amended in 1988, provides the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) with discretionary authority to
recommend a wide variety of trade sanctions against countries
which, inter alia, engage in acts, policies, and practices that
"constitute a persistent pattern of conduct denying internation-
ally recognized worker rights."96 As already noted, the Burma
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 bans all trade between the
United States and Burma on, inter alia, grounds of egregious
violations of core labor rights.
In addition, with respect to developing countries in particu-
lar, trade preferences granted under the GSP are denied to a
country that is determined not to be "taking steps" to implement
internationally recognized workers' rights.97 These rights are
defined as: the right of association; the right to organize and
bargain collectively; freedom from any kind of forced or compul-
sory labor; a minimum age for the employment of children; and
acceptable conditions of employment with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.98 Al-
though application of trade sanctions against unfair labor prac-
tices involves a unilateral judgment by the U.S. authorities
about the domestic policies of other countries, the language of
the U.S. statute does suggest as a reference point certain widely
accepted international norms, as reflected in the Conventions of
the International Labour Organization. In other words, al-
though the process is unilateral, it refers to rights recognized in
international instruments. Section 301 measures, however,
could include withdrawal of trade concessions bound in WTO
schedules, and would therefore result in a conflict with WTO ob-
ligations as they currently stand.
In fact, while GSP preferences have been withdrawn nu-
merous times, section 301 action has yet to be taken on the basis
of consistent non-compliance with international labor rights.
The relevant legislation with respect to GSP preferences allows
interested parties to bring a petition before the GSP Subcom-
96. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
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mittee, an inter-agency group of U.S. trade officials, requesting
review of the labor rights performance of a country with, or
seeking, GSP status. The review may result in a recommenda-
tion to the President that a country's GSP status be withdrawn.
The OECD notes:
In reviewing workers' rights petitions, the GSP Subcommittee under-
takes a thorough investigation in order to obtain a balanced view using
information from a variety of sources. The Subcommittee looks in par-
ticular for evidence of progress in the country's legislation and in its
practices, and relies on ILO Conventions and Recommendations as
benchmarks for interpreting progress.99
The OECD further notes that the pressure created by public
exposure and scrutiny of labor practices in such reviews may
have an impact on performance, even apart from the threat of
actual sanctions through GSP withdrawal. According to the
OECD as well, "[from] 1984 through 1995, 40 countries have
been named in petitions citing labor rights abuses according to
GSP law," with fewer than half these cases being pursued by the
Subcommittee to the stage of a formal review.10 0 According to
Dufour, among the countries that have had their GSP status
withdrawn by virtue of a recommendation of the Subcommittee
are: the Central African Republic, Chile, Liberia, Myanmar,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, and the Sudan. A later study of
the effects of labor conditionality in U.S. GSP preferences by El-
liot came to the conclusion that "[t]he U.S. experience in apply-
ing workers rights conditionality to trade benefits under the
GSP suggests that external pressure can be helpful in improv-
ing treatment of workers in developing countries and that link-
age of trade and worker rights need not devolve into simple pro-
tectionism."10 1
In 1995, the European Union amended its GSP programme
so as to condition the granting of a margin of preferentiality in
excess of a base rate upon, inter alia, respect for certain core la-
bor rights; the relevant EU regulations refer explicitly to the
99. See TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE
WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion & Development) (1996) [hereinafter OECD Study].
100. Id.
101. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Preferences for Workers? Worker's Rights and the
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, Speech for the Faculty Spring Conference
at Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Michigan (last revised May 8, 2000), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/elliott0598.htm; see also Lance Compa & Jef-
frey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20- Year Re-
view, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 199 (2001).
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ILO Conventions concerning freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining, as well as child labor. 102 This provision came
into force in 1998. In addition, GSP status may be withdrawn
altogether where a country permits any form of slavery or the
exportation of products made with prison labor. 103
C. NAFTA AND THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR
COOPERATION (NAALC)
In the context of NAFTA, U.S. concerns in particular about
Mexican labor practices led to the negotiation of a parallel ac-
cord on labor standards. Mexican labor laws do provide for most
of the workers rights contained in the ILO Conventions, but are
widely believed to be un- or under-enforced. 104 Some proponents
of NAFTA attribute this un- or under-enforcement to a shortage
of labor inspectors. 10 5 The problem, however, is likely much
more deeply rooted, reflecting widespread corruption of politi-
cians or public officials (especially at the regional or local level),
and the use of intimidation and violence to keep workers from
organizing in some parts of Mexico, such as the economically
important Maquiladora zone.106 Furthermore, as Morici sug-
gests, there may be collusion between the Mexican government
and the official Mexican trade union movement to keep workers
unorganized in the Maquiladoras so as to attract more foreign
investment into Mexico.
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,10 7
usually referred to as the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, has
two major components. The first is a hard legal obligation on
the part of NAFTA Parties to enforce adequately their own do-
mestic labor laws, particularly with respect to occupational
safety and health, child labor and minimum wage standards
(Articles 3, 27).108 This obligation may be described as hard, in
that a binding dispute settlement process may, where there is





106. See Bruce Allen, Auto Restructuring and Mexico's Maquiladora Zone, avail-
able at http://flag.blackened.netfblackflag/210/21Onafta.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2005).
107. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1499 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC].
108. Id. at arts. 3, 27.
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tary judgment against the offending Party. In the case of a suc-
cessful action against Canada, the monetary judgment can be
enforced through an order of a Canadian domestic court; in the
case of the United States and Mexico, it may be enforced
through withdrawal of concessions under NAFTA.109 Another
substantive obligation of the Side-Agreement is that "each Party
shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high
labor standards consistent with high quality and productivity
workforces, and shall continue to strive to improve those stan-
dards in that light" (Article 2).11o This obligation, however, is
hedged by the qualifying language that it is subject to "the right
of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards,"
and-unlike the Article 3 obligation-no means of legal en-
forcement is contemplated for this obligation.111
A Commission for Labor Cooperation is provided for, com-
prised of a Council and a Secretariat (Article 8), charged with,
inter alia, promoting the collection and dissemination of data on
labor issues, the production and publication of reports and stud-
ies, and the facilitation of consultation between the Parties on
labor matters (Article 10).112 Article 11 provides a list of specific
matters regarding which the Council "shall promote cooperative
activities between the Parties, as appropriate." NAALC Annex
1 states that the Parties are "committed to promote" a range of
labor principles, including freedom of association and the right
to organize, prohibition of forced labor, "labor protections for
children and young persons," and elimination of employment
discrimination. 113
The primary avenue for complaints by interested Parties
that a NAFTA Party is not enforcing its labor laws, is through
the National Administrative Office of one of the other two
NAFTA Parties. 114 Thus, the U.S. National Administrative Of-
fice (NAO) typically receives complaints about under-
enforcement, or non-enforcement of Mexican labor law. The
NAO may accept or reject the complaint for review, and in the
109. Id. at arts. 41, 41A.
110. Id. at art. 2.
111. Id.
112. Id. at arts. 8, 10.
113. Id. at annex 1.
114. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Bureau of International Labor Af-
fairs, U.S. Department of Labor, North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation-A
Guide, available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/naalcgd.htm (Apr.
1998) (explaining that a primary function of a National Administrative Office is the
receiving and reviewing of public submissions).
[Vol. 14:2
TRADE POLICY & LABOR STANDARDS
case of rejection must furnish written reasons to the complain-
ant.115 Such a review produces a report, which may or may not
recommend ministerial consultations. The sole avenue through
which enforcement action may eventually be taken against a
NAFTA Party is, however, through panel dispute settlement,
and two of the three NAFTA Parties must consent to the strik-
ing of a panel. To date, a variety of complaints have been been
accepted for review by NAOs, with Mexico named as the offend-
ing Party in all but one. 116 Several of the submissions have re-
sulted in Ministerial Consultations. In almost all cases, the
complaints have concerned failure to enforce the right of free as-
sociation and the right to organize. 117 An important exception is
a recent complaint concerning pregnancy-based discrimination
by Maquiladora employers. It has been claimed that the public-
ity effects of these complaints, and the reports and consultations
which have resulted, have led to some positive adjustments in
labor law enforcement; however, the Mexican and in one case
the U.S. authorities have not surprisingly left unacknowledged
the role of the NAALC in altering their dispositions on the mat-
ters at issue. Many of the cases have involved anti-union activ-
ity by major multinational corporations or their local affiliates,
including General Electric, Honeywell, and Sprint. In these
kinds of cases, it has been difficult to ascertain whether the
NAO report had a positive impact on the practices of the corpo-
ration, even if it does not result in the government itself improv-
ing its enforcement of labor laws. In no case has a matter been
taken to an arbitral panel.
In the ITAPSA case, workers in Mexico were subject to
various kinds of intimidation and harassment surrounding a
vote on the certification of an independent union.11 8 The Minis-
terial Consultations actually resulted in a Ministerial Agree-
115. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Bureau of International Labor Af-
fairs, U.S. Department of Labor, Revised Notice of Establishment of U.S. National
Administrative Office and Procedural Guidelines, available at http://www.dol.gov/
ilab/programs/nao/procguide.htm (Apr. 7, 1994).
116. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Bureau of International Labor Af-
fairs, U.S. Department of Labor, Status of Submissions Under the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/programs/
nao/status.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (summarizing and listing submissions
filed with NAOs).
117. Id.
118. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Bureau of International Labor Af-
fairs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Public Report of Review 9703 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/execsum9703.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2005).
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ment between the United States and Mexico, that Mexico would
promote secret ballots and "neutral" voting places. Mexico, how-
ever, does not appear to have honoured this Agreement, and a
complaint by U.S. unions to the U.S. Department of Labor con-
cerning Mexico's failure to comply with the Agreement was dis-
missed in 2001.119 Based on these and other developments from
the inception of NAFTA up to 2003, Compa presents a pessimis-
tic overall assessment of the results from the NAFTA Labor
Side Agreement: the NAALC has failed to achieve its high pur-
pose.
Apparently more eager to maintain diplomatic niceties
rather than tackle and solve worker rights violations, the three
governments have demonstrated a lack of will to hold one an-
other to their NAALC commitments. Some investigations and
reports have led to significant findings and recommendations,
but they have not produced change. Ministerial consultations
resulted only in research projects and trinational conferences.
Although these are often informative, they have not directly ad-
dressed or resolved worker rights violations documented and
proven in NAALC proceedings. 120 Because of the role of the
provinces in labor matters under the Canadian constitution,
Canada's full participation in the NAALC process was subject to
a minimum threshold of voluntary provincial involvement. 121 In
1997, the threshold specified in the NAALC was crossed, with
the federal government and three provinces (Manitoba, Quebec
and Alberta) having decided to participate. 122 Finally, there is
an additional mechanism in the NAALC, as yet unused, which
contemplates the striking of Evaluation Committees of Experts,
which may be requested by a Party under certain conditions: a
Committee may deal with "technical standards" in eight areas,
which include, inter alia, prohibition of forced labor, labor pro-
tection for children and young persons, and elimination of em-
ployment discrimination. 123
119. See Status of Submissions Under the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, supra note 117 (describing a dismissed complaint filed by the AFL-CIO
and PACE in 2001).
120. LAN'CE COMPA, JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN
MExIcO: A REPORT BY THE SOLIDARITY CENTER 41 (Solidarity Center 2003), avail-
able at http://www.solidaritycenter.org/document.cfm?documentID=346.
121. See NAALC, supra note 109, at annex 3 n.1.
122. See Canadian Department of Human Resources and Skills Development,
Signatories to the Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement, available at
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/enlp/spila/ialc/nao/03signatories-canadian-intergovernment
al-agreement.shtml (last modified Feb. 13, 2003).
123. See NAALC, supra note 107, at art. 23
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D. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Labor rights provisions have been incorporated into at least
two recent bilateral trade agreements, the U.S.-Jordan Free
Trade Agreement 124 and the U.S.-Cambodia Textile Trade
Agreement. 125 In the case of the U.S.-Jordan Agreement, the
provisions (unlike NAFTA) are incorporated in the main treaty
text, not a side accord. 126 Moreover, the obligations in question
are subject to the general dispute settlement procedures of the
Agreement. Nevertheless, by an exchange of letters, the United
States and Jordan have agreed that disputes concerning the la-
bor provisions of the Agreement shall not result in the imposi-
tion of sanctions. 12 7 The provisions in question are very similar
to those in the NAFTA side agreement. Thus, "a party shall not
fail to effectively enforce its labor laws ... in a manner affecting
trade."'128 In addition, "each Party shall strive to ensure that it
does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
otherwise derogate from [domestic labor laws] ... as an encour-
agement for trade with the other Party."'129 The rather odd lan-
guage "in a manner affecting trade" appears to be some sort of
qualifier, suggesting that labor obligations only apply in sectors
or situations where there is actual trade between the United
States and Jordan.
The relevant provision in the U.S.-Cambodia Agreement is
different. It reads as follows:
Cambodia shall support the implementation of a program to improve
the working conditions in the textile and apparel sector, including in-
ternationally recognized core labor standards, through the application
of Cambodian labor law ... The Government of the United States will
make a determination.., whether working conditions in the Cambo-
dia textile and apparel sector substantially comply with such labor law
and standards. 1 3
0
If the United States determines that the Cambodian gar-
124. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-
Jordan, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002) (entered into force Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.-
Jordan FTA].
125. See Establishment of a Bilateral Textile Agreement, Jan. 1, 1999, U.S.-
Cambodia, available at http://usembassy.state.gov/cambodia/wwwf0032.pdf [herein-
after U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement].
126. See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 124.
127. Jim Abrams, US Senate Passes Jordan FTA Bill, JORDAN TIMES, Sept. 25,
2001, available at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/O9252001001.htm.
128. See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 124, at art. 6.
129. Id.
130. See U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement, supra note 125, at art. 10.
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ment industry is in substantial compliance, it could increase
Cambodia's textile quota up to 14% per year, above the standard
6% quota increase. 131
CONCLUSION
Increasingly, discussion in the international policy commu-
nity on the relationship between liberal trade and labor rights
has focused on the issue of compliance with core universal
rights, which have a close relationship to the rights contained in
general international human rights instruments such as the UN
Declaration and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Competitiveness-based claims about "social dumping" have be-
come less prominent, and the notion that the objective should be
to achieve some kind of "level playing field" between developed
and developing countries is now heard less frequently, even
from labor rights advocates on the left of the political spectrum.
In sum, contrary to the picture still painted by some free trad-
ers, the claim for a trade and labor rights link is not some fa-
natical or protectionist adventure to attempt harmonization of
conditions of work across the world, regardless of different eco-
nomic and cultural conditions, but rather an attempt to ensure
respect for core labor standards conceived of as universal human
rights.
131. See Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working to Improve
Conditions in Cambodia's Garment Factories, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 79
(2004); Regina Abrami, Harvard Business School Case Study, Workers Rights and
Global Trade: The U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement (November 4,
2004), available at http://www.harvardbusinessonline.com.
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